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ABSTRACT 
Client Importance and Audit Quality in Highly Connected Jurisdictions 
by 
YUEN Kelly Grani  
Master of Philosophy 
The study focuses on the audit quality issue in three culturally and commercially 
highly connected jurisdictions with very different legal systems which affect 
auditors. Hong Kong practices common law, Taiwan practices civil law, and the 
People’s Republic of China (Mainland China) practices a socialist legal system. 
Taiwan adopts a civil law system with heavy influence by common law countries. It 
is therefore motivating to assess how auditors in each of the three connected 
jurisdictions with distinctive legal environments handle the audit quality for 
important clients. Accounting scandals and auditing frauds are perceived to be driven 
by aggressive companies and misrepresentation of audit reports. However, a locale’s 
legal system and law enforcements should affect the services auditors provide to 
their clients, particularly ‘important’ clients. I find that in all three jurisdictions, the 
more important the client to its auditor, the lower the audit quality as measured by 
restatement of financial statements. However, I find mixed results when using other 
measures of audit quality.  
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Client Importance and Audit Quality in Highly Connected Jurisdictions 
Chapter 1    Introduction 
The aftermath of Enron with Arthur Anderson in 2001 (Asthana, Balsam and Kim, 
2009), Lehman Brothers with Ernst and Young in 2008 (Sikka, 2009), Barclay’s 
Libor manipulation in2012 (Vasudev and Rodriguez, 2013) and Tesco case in 
2014 (Mohamed and Handley-Schachler, 2015) with PricewaterhouseCoopers, did 
not stop corporate managers and external auditors from augmenting financial data 
and keeping their companies on a going concern basis. In Asia, Toshiba had hidden 
billions of dollars in losses due to internal audit failure in 2011 (Jennings, 2015), 
while Baker Tilly failed to detect significant related-party transactions for Mainland 
China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd, prompting the U.S Securities and 
Exchange Commission(US SEC) to file a lawsuit in 2014 (Carcello, Carver and 
Lennox, 2014). In fact, US SEC has been displeased for years that whenever a U.S.-
listed Chinese company is involved in a scandal, the U.S. Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board is not able to access to any of its auditing documents 
for follow-through investigations (Zarroli, 2012).  Consequently, on top of 
accounting frauds, auditing scandals are also hitting the news headlines hard and 
frequent, to an extent that investors and the public have taken it as ‘habitual’ news.   
The consequence of collusion between companies and auditors will not only bring 
in waves of financial crisis (namely, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2000 
recession, the 2001 dot-com bubble, the 2007 global financial crisis, and now the 
European debt crisis) it will also drag investors into distrust of listed companies’ 
financial statements, as well as reputable auditors’ renowned audit opinion. If the 
public stops trusting the accountants, fewer investments may be made, affecting our 
economy. Audit failures and collusion between managers and auditors are, in fact, 
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not fully litigated in courts. There is still a significant confusion in numerous courts 
about the auditor’s specific role and responsibility in the failure of audit reports 
(Brown, 2007). Some auditors are willing to accept side-payments from their clients 
in exchange for their acceptance of risk of collusion with the client’s management 
(Antle, 1984).  
Standard setters and the court often drive the public’s attention by putting the 
blame solely on the auditor and on the client. However, the root cause of such 
scandals may be due to the legal system, law enforcement, and the key mechanisms 
that affect the implementation of accounting standards (Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 
2008). With the focus on client importance and audit quality in highly connected 
jurisdictions, this thesis is therefore an important investigation as it attempts to 
identify an underlying cause of auditing frauds, and provide suggestions for 
regulators on how they may modify the enforcement schemes of legal systems, such 
that collusion between companies and auditors can be reduced. 
Previous studies and literature have focused on the effect of accounting scandals 
primarily in the United States and the United Kingdom, while other studies have 
investigated the relationship of client importance and audit quality either in common 
law societies, in civil law jurisdictions, or in the People’s Republic of China 
(Mainland China) alone. However, none of these have directly compared the audit 
quality for important clients in jurisdictions with different legal systems 
simultaneously in one investigation. Using data from Mainland China, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan during 2008-2013, I find that the more important the client is to its 
auditor, the lower the audit quality, as measured by the Restatement of Financial 
Statements (RESTATE) in all three jurisdictions. In Hong Kong, however, the more 
important the client is to its auditor, the higher the quality of audit report as 
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measured by modified audit opinion (MAO), This is an interesting result indicating 
that although Hong Kong auditors are conservative in terms of issuing MAO, their 
certified financial statements are subject to more restatements for more important 
clients. The fact that Mainland China, Taiwan, and HK are under the “one nation 
different systems” policy, cultural and political aspects have shaped their legal 
system differently. As such, the thesis argues that the different legal systems play a 
direct role in influencing audit quality. Furthermore, I do take into consideration that 
different local auditors are subject to different external factors and influences, such 
as auditor’s legal liability, market and economic factors, as well as political 
considerations.  The thesis will therefore include relevant control variables in the 
regression tests. 
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. The thesis contributes to 
accounting literature, with a wider perspective than a single-country study on 
whether important audit clients actually manage to obtain cleaner audit reports from 
reputable auditors in jurisdictions that are highly connected culturally and 
commercially but with different legal systems. The results of my study should be 
useful to regulators by providing new perspectives on how differences in these 
jurisdictions affect the relationship between audit quality and client importance. 
Previous literature and findings were limited in single-country settings. The thesis is 
therefore an answer to the call for further cross-country research in audit quality and 
client importance (DeFond and Francis, 2005). Moreover, the thesis examines 
whether the audit quality for important clients may vary when different measures of 
audit quality are used.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter two, a brief description of 
the three locales and their respective legal jurisdictions are introduced, followed by 
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the development of the hypotheses in Chapter three. The research methods and 
model specification are then explained in Chapter four, and the models are derived 
and justified. In Chapter five, the thesis presents the sample data, the descriptive 
statistics and the empirical test results. Robustness tests are then followed in Chapter 
six, while Chapter seven concludes the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 Institutional Backgrounds and Literature Review 
The thesis is based on three culturally and commercially connected jurisdictions: 
Hong Kong represents the common law jurisdiction, Mainland China represents the 
socialist legal system, and Taiwan represents the civil law jurisdiction. The three 
jurisdictions have distinct features such as auditors’ legal liability, market 
regulations and political influences, where the origins of the laws are relatively clear 
and unique.  
 
2.1 The Common Law Region 
Hong Kong (HK) is a major financial hub with a highly liquid financial market 
and rapid business growth in the past decades, with both national businesses and 
international enterprises setting foot into HK. While being returned to the People’s 
Republic of China (Mainland China), HK today is still following the English 
common law system. The Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(HKICPA) has fully adapted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
through localizing them into Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (HKFRS) 
and the Hong Kong Standard of Auditing (HKSA). Therefore, as a common law 
region, and a Chinese city with heavy western influences, HK is an interesting locale 
to be included in this thesis’s research sample.   
 
2.2 The Socialist Legal Region 
With the highest percentage of the global population in one country, multinational 
enterprises are keen on expanding and entering Mainland China for business 
development. In fact, Mainland China’s accounting developments play a major role 
in the economy’s structural changes over the years (Nobes and Parker, 2012). On 
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January 1 2007, Mainland China moved from using the Chinese Accounting 
Standards (CAS) into using the new accounting standards which is equivalent to 
IFRS; While in accordance with the principle of continuous and comprehensive 
convergence, the Chinese Auditing Standards Board has completed the revision of 
Chinese Standards of Auditing (CSAs), and achieved full convergence with the 
clarified International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) (IFAC, 2010). The purpose of 
converging the Chinese standards with international standards is to better 
communicate with international investors – a crucial part of Mainland China’s 
economic development and future growth plans.  
Although Mainland China adopts the socialist legal system, with the aim to 
internationalize their economy, their rules of law have undergone rapid changes and 
developments. The accounting standards in Mainland China are still under the 
control of the Ministry of Finance, indicating a prevailing centralist culture of a 
bureaucratic economy. In other words, a small panel of officials ultimately decide or 
heavily influence the Mainland China’s legal system and accounting regulations.  
Furthermore, with an attempt to internationalize the ‘centrally planned’ Chinese 
economy into a “market” economy, previous accounting practices are being revised. 
The Chinese Ministry of Finance chose to converge the CAS with IFRS. Although 
this may facilitate and encourage overseas investors to invest in Chinese companies, 
small firms and local businesses find it difficult to transit into the new system, hence 
may not be able to prepare their financial statements that give a true and fair view of 
their underlying transactions.  
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2.3 The Civil Law Region 
Taiwan is a capitalist region with a recent transition from a ‘planned’ to a ‘free-
market’ economy, where its accounting standards are regulated by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Committee (FASC) with little government control. Taiwan’s 
rule of law is relatively well-established and developed. Until today, USA is one of 
the strongest and biggest trade partners with Taiwan. In fact, the USA has substantial 
influence on Taiwan’s financial reporting and auditing regulations: Taiwan’s current 
accounting standards refer to both IAS and the US GAAP, and that their financial 
accounting does not follow its tax accounting (Nobes and Parker, 2012).  
The difference between Taiwan and Mainland China’s legal and political systems 
has impacts on their respective accounting practice (Sawani, 2009). Without doubt, 
Taiwan’s accounting practice is part of its legal system. Since 2009, Taiwan has 
established a mandatory adoption of US GAAP or the IFRS and IAS standards for 
listed companies, while other unlisted companies and financial institutions are 
permitted to adopt the US GAAP or IFRS from 2013. 
Therefore, with the abovementioned considerations, while recognizing that they 
have different social and economic development, Mainland China and Taiwan will 
be an excellent representation of well-connected jurisdictions in Asia to be included 
in this thesis’s sample data.  
 
2.4 Incentives for Auditors in the three locales 
As Firth (2002) demonstrates, on top of the level of audit fees that will alter the 
auditor’s behavior in delivering a clean audit opinion, auditors from the three locales 
will also have different incentives in treating their important clients differently. This 
thesis has identified three major categories of incentive to prompt external auditors 
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to treat important clients differently: legal liabilities, market and economic factors, 
and political considerations. 
2.4.1 Legal Liabilities 
Whether or not the auditor will face greater risk of legal liability due to 
professional negligence, affects their behaviors on important clients. Given that high 
audit quality depends on the proper implementation of established auditing standards, 
more efforts need to be given by the Chinese regulators to ensure effective and 
quality compliance with its CSA (World Bank Financial Management unit, 2009). 
Since 2007, Mainland China has developed and revised its legislative and regulatory 
framework for Company Law, Securities Law, Tax Law, Accounting Law, and the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Certified Public Accountants, with the 
hope to converge with the international market. The Ministry of Finance, together 
with the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA), review the 
performance of external auditors who audit listed Mainland Chinese companies 
every three years. Furthermore, under Mainland China’s Company Law Article 166, 
the management and the auditors are required to submit an audited annual report to 
its shareholders; failure to do so will permit shareholders to put the company and the 
auditors under litigation, industrial discipline, civil liabilities, as well as public 
condemnation. 
Also, the Ministry of Finance in Mainland China require the audit engagement 
partner to be rotated every five years. Similar to international auditing standards, 
listed companies in Mainland China are required to establish an Audit Committee, 
explicitly to oversee whether the audit procedure is conducted independently. Also 
align with the International Federation of Accountants’ requirement regarding 
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conflict of interest, Mainland auditors are not permitted to provide non-audit services 
to their audit clients.  
According to CICPA Article 23 and 24, auditing firms must be established in 
the form of partnership, or of limited liability. It is required that audit reports are 
issued in the name of the audit firm, where the audit firm must be registered with the 
Ministry of Finance, in order to be qualified as a statutory auditor. Such audit firm 
must also include at least two qualified CICPA partners. Since the principal auditor 
must sign the audit report issued (Gillis, 2014), negligence and non-compliance of 
accounting standards will put audit partners and his engagement team under the 
spotlight, possibly facing civil and criminal liabilities. It is therefore required by the 
CICPA, that audit firms should establish a pool of funds for professional liabilities, 
as well as purchasing professional liability insurances. Since 1998/1999, a 
disaffiliation exercise for Mainland China CPA firms took place, requiring all firms 
to either be formed under unlimited liability partnership form of organization or 
under limited liability legal form (Firth, Mo and Wong, 2012). Similarly, in year 
2010, Mainland CPA firms are required to transit into Special general partnership 
form. The promulgation and implementation of this requirement increased auditor’s 
risk and liabilities significantly. The significant increase of risk  exposure for  
Mainland CPA firms played a significant impact on the auditor’s reporting behavior, 
increasing the audit quality (He, Pan and Tian, 2014). Additionally, Firth et al. (2012) 
demonstrates that audit firms in unlimited liability legal form tend to be more 
conservative than audit firms with limited liabilities. In turn, unlimited liability 
auditors will be more vigilant and prudent when issuing an unmodified audit report. 
This directly affects the audit quality of listed companies in Mainland China. 
Likewise, the Mainland Supreme People’s Court established a new clause on trials 
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involving audit services in 2007, where the investors (the plaintiff) has the capacity 
to sue negligent auditors (defendant) under a civil law suit and demand for 
compensation. 
On the other hand, HK auditor’s legal liability to their clients is based on a 
broad principle of “failure to use reasonable care” (Johnston and Parker, 2007). This 
indicates that as long as the auditor is able to defend himself for being prudent and 
provide legitimate reasons, despite infringing specific accounting standards, the 
court may deem him innocent. Such common law practice is the direct opposite from 
the socialist legal system and the civil law’s “box-ticking” approach, where auditors 
from Mainland China and Taiwan must strictly comply with their respective 
standards. Furthermore, under the HK company law, auditors’ scope of being liable 
to parties other than their clients, is minimal (Johnston and Parker, 2007). In fact, 
HK auditor’s liability is “restricted to cases where the auditor has assumed 
responsibility to the particular third party”, such as auditor’s knowledge of which the 
third party’s reliance placed on the audit report. But in practice, such liability “has 
proved difficult to establish”. This allows HK auditors to hide away from 
responsibilities. In contrast, the Mainland law specifically states that the “an auditor 
is liable to its clients and other interested parties if [the auditor] fails to comply with 
the accounting standards, and knowingly or negligently produces an inaccurate audit 
report”. In other words, Mainland China auditors have direct responsibility to 
shareholders of the listed companies, over their false and misleading financial 
statements.  
Given that Taiwan’s accounting standards follow the US-GAAP closely, after 
the implementation of SOX in the USA, Taiwan has made amendments to its 
accounting standards as well. From 2003, it is mandatory for audit partners of listed 
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companies to rotate every five years, audit reports must disclose the name of the 
audit firm and the audit partner, and that the client’s financial statements will be 
scrutinized and reviewed by Taiwan Stock Exchange (Chi et. al., 2009). Also, it is 
compulsory to state both the audit firm and the audit partner’s names in the audit 
report, as shareholders will be fully compensated by the negligent auditor/ company 
director, if the shareholder wins the civil lawsuit(Taiwan Principal Company Law 
and Regulations, Section 4 Article 215). This prompts Taiwan auditors to be 
conservative towards issuing unqualified audit opinions, which give rise to higher 
audit quality. 
 
2.4.2 Market and Economic Factors 
Pearson and Trompeter (1994) found that highly competitive (and not 
concentrated) audit markets tend to offer lower audit fees. A highly concentrated 
market is when a few large audit firms have a large number of listed companies as 
their audit clients, within a jurisdiction. In contrast, a decentralized market has 
higher competition among the audit firms within a jurisdiction. Small audit firms 
therefore have the ability to compete with say Big 4 auditors in tendering for more 
clients. Consequently, given that clients are open to switching auditors and select the 
inexpensive tenders (the auditors), audit firms will compete against each other 
through providing a wider range of accounting-related services, better quality audits 
and reduced audit fee. As auditors are competing among themselves in offering 
lower-priced audits to their potential clients, another of their selling point is product 
differentiation – to provide clients with high quality services with a premium price 
(Lee, 1996). In other words, highly concentrated markets may give rise to higher 
audit fees and possibly lower audit quality reports, due to the lack of competition 
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among the audit firms. With a presumption that market competitiveness and market 
concentration are negatively correlated to one another, the thesis uses market 
concentration to measure the competitiveness of the auditing industry. As such, 
market concentration is defined as whether the Big N audit firms are dominating the 
auditing industry, implying that if the top N firms have significant market share, a 
highly concentrated market exists. 
HK is known to have one of the most concentrated markets in China, where the 
Big 4 auditors have great dominance in providing audit services to listed companies. 
The Big 4 audit firms in China on the other hand, only share 30% of all accounting 
profits in the Mainland (HKTDC, 2003), indicating Big N audit firms in Mainland 
China have a relatively small market share (Chen, Chi and Lin, 2012). This suggests 
that the lack of competition in the auditing industry in HK prompts auditors in 
issuing lower quality audit reports. A justification to this line of reasoning is the 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) reached between CICPA and 
HKICPA in year 2010, where Mainland China companies listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange could “prepare financial statements in accordance with Mainland 
China’s accounting standards and engage in a CPA firm on the Mainland to perform 
auditing services” (HKTDC, 2014). The implication of the CEPA on HK auditors is 
its escalation of pressure and competition between HK auditors and Mainland 
Chinese auditors in tendering for Mainland-based clients. HK auditors may further 
lower its budget and audit fees, hence sacrificing the quality of audit reports. 
Continuing with the abovementioned factor regarding market competition, numerous 
HK auditors are facing competitive pressure in targeting Mainland Chinese clients, 
especially SMEs and SOEs. In response, one of HK auditor’s product differentiation 
is by offering clients a wide range of professional services, including “auditing, tax 
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consultancy, advisory, bookkeeping and training” to boost its competitiveness 
(HKTDC, 2003). As stated by the HKICPA’s Code Of Ethics, however, auditors 
auditing listed companies should not provide non-audit services to their clients, as it 
poses a threat to independence, familiarity threat, self-review threat, and threat of 
financial dependence.  
 
2.4.3 Political Considerations 
Bushman and Piotroski (2005)find that in civil law jurisdictions, which tend to 
have more state-owned enterprises (SOEs), will “speed the recognition of good news 
and slow the recognition of bad news” relative to common law jurisdictions. This 
suggests that the high number of SOEs in Mainland China may give rise to lower 
audit quality, as ‘bad’ news are concealed. In contrast, Abdul-Wahab et al. (2009) 
suggested that politically connected SOEs are perceived as high-risk clients to 
auditors. Auditors may be inclined to charge politically connected clients with higher 
audit fees, as they generally have inadequate corporate governance and greater 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. As such, additional monitoring 
costs and auditing hours are required, constituting to higher audit fees. However, as 
mentioned by Pearson and Trompeter (1994), higher audit fees do not necessarily 
give rise to high audit quality. 
Auditors' incentives in treating important clients differently in the three highly 
connected jurisdictions are summarized as below: 
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Summary of Incentives for Auditors 
Incentives 
Locales 
Auditor legal liability Market and Economic Factors Political Considerations 
Mainland 1) Mandatory submission of audited annual 
report to shareholders, but shareholders’ 
approval of annual report is not required ; 
2) Audit engagement partner to be rotated 
every 5 years; 
3) Required establishment of an Audit 
Committee to oversee audit procedures ; 
4) Auditors are not permitted to provide non-
audit services to audit clients; 
5) Audit firms must be established in the form 
of special general partnership or limited 
liability company; 
6) Audit firms must be registered with the 
MOF, and be a statutory auditor ; 
7) Principal auditor must sign the audit report, 
where the audit firm and audit partner’s 
names are disclosed in the audit report. 
1) Clients competing for high quality 
yet inexpensive tenders; 
2) Big 4 firms have relatively small 
market share. 
1) Higher number of 
SOEs present in the 
market; 
2) Recognizing ‘good’ 
news much faster 
than disclosing 
‘bad’ news; 
3) SOE clients are 
perceived to be 
high-risk clients by 
auditors.  
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Summary of Incentives for Auditors (Continued) 
Taiwan 1) Closely follows US-GAAP and SOX; 
2) Mandatory for audit partners to rotate every 
5 years ; 
3) Taiwan Stock Exchange reviews listed 
company’s financial statements ; 
4) Audit firm and audit partner’s names are 
disclosed in the audit reports. 
1) Increasing trend of market 
concentration, dominated by the Big 
N accounting firms (Lee, 2010) ; 
2) Has an oligopoly market, especially 
in the audit, tax, management 
consultancy, and corporate 
registration field ; 
3) High number of mergers of 
accounting firms, combining 
professional expertise and fostering 
audit market competitiveness 
(Chang, Chen, and Chan, 2009; 
Wootton et al., 1994). 
1) Domestic audit 
firms build alliance 
with accounting 
firms in the USA ; 
2) Significant 
amendments on 
CPA regulations, 
drawing 
government 
authorities’ and the 
public’s attention. 
(Lee, 2010). 
Hong Kong 1) Unlike Mainland China’s “box-ticking” 
approach, legal liability is judged on the 
principle of “failure to use reasonable skill 
and care”; 
2) Minimal scope of liabilities to stakeholders, 
other than their clients. 
1) Highly concentrated market; 
2) Big 4 firms have great dominance in 
the audit market ; 
3) The CEPA between CICPA and 
HKICPA increased competitiveness 
and pressure for HK auditors ; 
4) HK auditors attempt to attract clients 
through providing audit clients with 
non-audit services as well. 
1) Minimal number of 
SOEs present in the 
market ; 
2) ‘Bad’ news are 
recognized and 
disclosed 
immediately, 
increasing audit 
conservatism. 
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2.5 Literature Review 
Auditors have cost advantages over competitors and earn quasi rents (audit fees 
in excess of audit costs) in subsequent audits in terms of the significant client-
specific start-up costs. Hence, auditors are not expected to be perfectly independent 
of their clients, because the latter one can terminate their bilateral relationship 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Therefore, the larger share the client occupies in an auditor’s 
business, the stronger the incentive the auditor has to retain that client, thus possibly 
compromise audit quality. For instance, auditors who issued a qualified audit report 
to an important client, and subsequently the client disagrees with their modified 
report, the client may be inclined to go shopping for unmodified clean reports. In 
order to retain such clients and to reduce specific client’s engagement start-up costs, 
auditors may compromise their independence by issuing clean audit reports. Audit 
quality therefore decreases.   
However, previous literatures exhibit mixed evidence. DeAngelo (1981) 
demonstrated that audit quality is not independent of auditor’s economic dependence 
on client, as they have a fear of losing the important client. Likewise, Chung and 
Kallapur (2003) examined client importance in terms of client’s total fees to firm’s 
total revenue, as well as the ratio of non-audit fees to firm’s total revenues. Both 
measures are highly correlated, implying that auditors who are economically 
dependent on clients may be willing to compromise their independence. Salehi (2009) 
suggests that external auditors who provide their audit client non-audit services, such 
as tax and advisory services, the quality and independence of their audit reports 
become questionable. The audit report’s accountability and full disclosures become 
biased, and there is a strong negative effect on audit independence as the auditor 
provides more professional services for the same client. Moreover, Sharma, et al. 
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(2011) demonstrates the strong and positive relationship between client importance 
and earnings management, with the presence of the audit committee as a moderator. 
On the other hand, Gaver and Paterson (2007) argues that audit quality is not 
compromised when the client is economically significant to the auditor; suggesting 
that audit quality is not affected by client size, but by client’s personal relationship 
with the auditor. Chen, Sun, and Wu (2010) also suggests that audit quality is not 
solely affected by client’s economic importance. The economic and legal system of a 
locale are strongly associated with the audit quality too. In fact, they established a 
relationship that in the mid-1990s, modified audit opinions were negatively 
correlated with auditor’s high economic dependence on important clients. That is, 
lower audit quality for important clients in the mid-1990s. As the economic and 
market policies became more transparent and investor-friendly in the early 2000s, 
auditor’s tendency in issuing MAOs is positively associated with client’s economic 
importance in Mainland China. Similarly, Reynolds and Francis (2001) suggests that 
auditors will not issue favorable audit reports to important clients, as large clients 
give rise to more litigation risks. Auditors are unwilling to compromise their 
reputation and goodwill.  
As suggested by Wu, Zeng and Wang (2014), numerous previous literature 
reviews have had opposing views and evidence. Whether or not there is an actual 
significant relationship between the two variables is still a question to answer. It is 
also worthy to note that previous literatures have not explored the relationship 
between client importance and audit quality in HK. It is therefore novel for this paper 
to investigate HK’s audit quality for important clients. Hence, this paper focuses on 
the relationship between client importance and audit quality in three highly 
connected locales with different legal jurisdictions, by using Modified Audit Opinion 
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(MAO), Restatement of financial statements (RESTATE), and discretional accruals 
(DACC), as measures of audit quality. The research design of this thesis is further 
strengthened and differentiated from previous studies through the consideration and 
incorporation of auditor’s legal liability, market and economic factors, and political 
considerations into the sensitivity analysis.  
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Chapter 3 Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Audit Quality 
In auditing, there are two competing forces that will affect the auditor’s 
behavior towards important clients when they discover client’s non-compliances: 
economic dependence and reputation protection (Reynolds and Francis, 2001). The 
auditors will make their decisions depending on the trade-off between their gains and 
losses. When the benefit is in excess of the loss, the auditors will decide to 
compromise their independence and reputation for an important client, thus audit 
quality will be dampened. Although multiple factors will affect audit quality, such as 
the skills and experience of auditors, and the audit methodology, audit quality is a 
complex concept which cannot boil down to one definition (Elshafie and Nyadroh, 
2014). While DeAngelo (1981) determines audit quality to be “the market assessed 
joint probability that a given auditor will both discover a breach in the client’s 
accounting system, and report the breach”, HKICPA addresses quality with two 
standards: HKSQC 1, addressing quality control procedures across the whole audit 
firm, and HKSA 220, focusing quality control in the context of individual audit 
engagements. 
 
3.2 Client Importance and Audit Quality 
Previous empirical studies found a positive relationship between client 
importance and audit quality. Firth (2002) demonstrates that the level of “audit fees” 
will alter the auditor’s behavior, possibly increasing the chance of delivering a clean 
audit opinion as audit fees are increased. Such factors are considered by the diligent 
Big 4 auditors, who apprehend that the cost of facing legal proceedings and 
reputation loss through issuing unmodified audit opinions to companies with 
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misreported financial statements does not outweigh the benefit of receiving higher 
audit fees from important clients. This is especially true in common law countries 
where law enforcement acts are more stringent with high penalties over financial 
misrepresentations. While Khurana and Raman (2006) found that higher audit fee 
paying clients have greater threat to audit independence, hence sabotaging the 
auditor’s reporting credibility, Gaver and Paterson (2007) confirmed Reynolds and 
Francis (2001)’s paper that auditors are more vigilant towards larger sized client’s 
accounting discretion. Lys and Watts (1994)’s findings is further consistent with the 
argument that larger clients are subject to higher audit and litigation risk, hence 
auditors are more conservative when auditing important clients. Furthermore, high 
litigation risk may lead to actual litigations and the risk of losing audit fees. Shu 
(2000) therefore established that auditors do attempt to disassociate and resign from 
clients with high risk and greater legal exposures. Evidence from Reynolds and 
Francis (2001) and DeFond and Francis (2005) shows losing an important client is 
more impactful at audit partner level and at local audit office levels, rather than to the 
audit firm as a whole. Chan (2010) further solidifies that local audit offices with 
greater economic dependence on important clients will treat such clients favorably.  
 
3.3 Other Incentives Affecting Audit Quality 
Further to this reasoning, the legal environment and law enforcement between 
common law, civil law, and the socialist legal jurisdictions are different. As 
compared to developed economies such as HK, Mainland China’s CPA firms face 
intense competition due to the low audit market concentration, where none of the 
auditors can monopolize the audit market. Big 4 audit firms in Mainland China hold 
on average 30% of the market share, indicating the clients have a high bargaining 
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power, and are able to impose pressure on auditors fighting for their slice of cake 
(Chen et al., 2007). Moreover, as Mainland China’s audit regulations are in the 
process of amendment since late 1990s, listed companies attempt to avoid regulatory 
attention and scrutiny through avoiding modified audit opinions. Also, audit firms 
who are inclined to issue modified audit reports tend to lose market share and 
important clients (DeFond, Wong and Li, 1999), therefore, auditors’ reliance on 
important client further increases in Mainland China. Additionally, Mainland China 
did not have a formal legal infrastructure in the early years to support their capital 
market development (Chen, 2003), indicating that litigation against accounting fraud 
and market manipulation was not significant: regulatory enforcement, auditor 
penalties, and criminal or civil litigation faced by Mainland auditors are therefore 
low (Pristor and Xu, 2005). As a matter of fact, Mainland China’s legal framework 
for civil or criminal liability is still perceived to be at its development stage (Li and 
He, 2000). 
HK, as a Special Administrative Region, has preserved the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration from 1984, which was a binding international agreement with the 
approval from the United Nations. The Declaration guides HK’s economic, political, 
and its legal system. Since 1st July, 1997, the Joint Declaration still continues to lead 
the HK’s legal system under the Basic Law (Leung, 1997). The fundamental value of 
the Common Law is the concept of the “rule of law”, where the laws in HK must 
operate under a separate system from the political system. This therefore guarantees 
the well-bring of investors and layman in HK, as the common law is perceived to be 
judged in a fair and unbiased manner.  
On the other hand, Taiwan’s civil law system focuses on statues rather than case 
law. This indicates that judges in courts will refer to the Constitution book, before 
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judging by the codes, statues, and ordinances. Taiwan’s legal system has undergone 
reforms and changes, with the hope of improving judicial transparency, judicial 
fairness, and judicial integrity (Columbus School of Law, 2003). As such, Taiwan 
has established separate courts for civil cases and ‘specialized’ cases, which in turn 
increased investor and the public’s confidence with its judiciary. The thesis therefore 
considers Taiwan as a median between Mainland China’s and HK’s legal systems. 
However, audit firms also have several other incentives to  protect their 
reputation and to reduce their litigation risk, such as market and economic factors 
and political considerations. Questionable audits can impair an office’s reputation 
and adversely affect its ability to obtain and retain clients in its local market 
(Reynolds and Francis 2001). DeFond, Wong and Li (1999) mentioned that large 
auditors in Mainland China who had a history of issuing modified audit opinions, 
their market share will decline overtime. In other words, subsequent to the 
implementation of new auditing standards and costly penalties for implementation of 
new auditing standards and costly penalties for non-compliance of auditing standards, 
clients will tend to seek out for smaller auditors in order to reduce their chances of 
receiving a modified audit opinion. Consequently, in order to retain market share and 
concentration, large Mainland auditors may compromise their independence for 
economically important clients. Similarly, Wang, Wong and Xia (2008) found that 
Mainland Chinese’s SOEs, who are controlled by the local government and have 
poorer earnings quality, have a higher tendency to hire small auditors rather than 
large reputable auditors, with the hope of receiving clean audit opinions. As small 
audit firms’ financial resources and professional know-how may not be comparable 
to large reputable audit firms, SOEs’ collusion incentive with small audit firms for  
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low audit quality reports may be found. In conclusion, market concentration and 
economic factors, and political consideration have impacts on the audit quality. 
Therefore, the hypothesis is derived based on an inductive reasoning that: 
H: In common law jurisdictions, the publicly listed company’s audit quality 
decreases to a lesser extent than that of civil law jurisdictions and the socialist legal 
system, as auditor’s economic dependence on important client increases, after 
considering: 
(1) auditors’ legal liabilities;
(2) market concentration and economic factors;
(3) political considerations.
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Chapter 4 Research Methods and Model Specification 
4.1 Measures of Audit Quality 
While some accounting bodies define audit quality as to whether the financial 
report conveys constructive information to investors, others define audit quality as 
“addressing quality control procedures across the whole audit firm and focuses on 
quality control in the context of individual audit engagements” (HKSQC1, HKSA 
220). As commonly found in the academic literature, this thesis will use (1) Modified 
Audit Opinions (DeFond et al., 2002; Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Carey and 
Simnett, 2006); (2) Financial Restatements (Kinney et al., 2004; Archambeault et al., 
2008; Chin and Chi, 2009); and (3) Discretional Accruals (Becker et al., 1998; 
Francis et al., 1999), in defining AQ. 
Theoretically, a high level of discretional accruals (DACC) implies the 
existence of earnings management and hence lower earnings quality and audit 
quality from the auditor. This indicates that if the auditor sees the benefit of 
satisfying a high-value client over potential litigation cost and public reputation, then 
DACC will increase as the client’s importance increases. Consequently, AQ plunges.  
A linear expectation model adapted from DeFond and Park (2001), to calculate 
unexpected accruals. The current year’s accruals will be predicted through the use of 
the following equation: 
NDAi = α1 (1/Ai) + α2[(ΔREVi – ΔRECi)/ Ai] + α3 (PPEi / Ai) 
where, 
NDAi is the non-discretionary accruals of firm i in year t; Ai is the total assets of firm 
i in year t-1; ΔREVi is the change in revenue of firm i in year t; ΔRECi is the change 
in accounts receivables of firm i in year t; PPEi is the total gross value of Property 
Plant Equipment for firm i in year t. 
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The above equation uses a listed company’s change in revenue, change in 
accounts receivables, and total PPE, and pro-rata it to firm i’s total assets. The 
benefit of using the linear expectation model through pro-rata is that it will enable 
me to compare companies to itself through the same currency, external factors, and 
its size (in terms of total assets), meaning it will help eliminate different country’s 
accounting standards and accrual methods’ variations. 
In order to calculate DACC, the following equation is used (Cahan and Zhang, 
2006): 
Abnormal accruals = total accruals (in year t) –  
predicted accruals (as calculated above) 
where, 
Total accruals = [ (earnings before extraordinary items in year t) – (operating cash 
flows in year t) ] / (total assets in year t-1) 
As presented in previous literature, Holthausen and Verrecchia(1988)’s model 
demonstrates that the magnitude of stock price response will increase as the precision 
and accuracy of auditor’s reported information increases. Kormendi and Lipe (1987) 
established a relationship between stock prices and reported earnings through the 
persistence of earnings. This implies that high DACC corresponds to low AQ.  
An alternative method used to measure AQ is Modified Audit Opinions (MAO). 
The sample entities used in the thesis includes all the listed companies within HK, 
Mainland China and Taiwan. It is therefore assumed that reputable audit firms will 
have more to lose if they fail to disclose client’s accounting breaches, and therefore 
will be motivated to issue audit reports that are true, fair and of high quality 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Also, due to large audit firms’ public reputation and stakeholder 
expectations, they are more conservative in issuing clean unmodified audit reports to 
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their clients (Francis and Krishnan, 1999), so to strategically minimize their audit 
risk when issuing such documents into the market (Johnstone and Bedard, 2004). 
Especially in Asia, where the consequence of misrepresentation of audit reports is 
significant, auditors will tend to issue MAO when faced with uncertainties in a client 
(Chan and Wu, 2011). As such, it can be assumed that a larger number of MAOs 
issued by a reputable auditor indicates a higher quality of audit reports published by 
them. In the context of the thesis, MAO will include “Unqualified opinion with 
Emphasis of Matter”, “Qualified opinion with Emphasis of Matter”, “Qualified 
opinion”, “Disclaimer opinion”, and “Adverse opinion”, as such financial statements 
are not presented in a clean, true, and fair manner. 
The thesis’s measurement and classification of MAO types may be argued as 
pseudo qualifications, as it combines a set of opinions of different degrees of severity 
into one category. However, as suggested from previous literature (Blandon and 
Bosch, 2013; Xie, Cai and Ye, 2010), such classification is deemed appropriate, as it 
reflects the auditor’s reporting behavior and treatment towards important clients. 
Whether or not the client’s matter is not material nor pervasive, the auditor’s 
willingness to issue an unqualified opinion demonstrates a clean, true, and fair 
financial statement. 
Lastly, Financial Restatements (RESTATE) of audit reports is another 
dependent dummy variable used to measure audit quality. RESTATE is when a 
company or an auditor discovers an error made in the financial statement from the 
previous year, while filing and disclosing such amendment to the public regarding 
the ‘correct’ figure (Olga, 2014). In the eye of a public investor, however, RESTATE 
is an indicator of negligent auditors, poor audit quality, and inadequate corporate 
governance policies within a company. Some investors perceive RESTATE as a sign 
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of auditors’ reduced audit effort in an attempt to make an engagement profitable, 
leading to potential financial reporting problems, and a loss of confidence in the 
value of the audit report (Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor, 2012). In effect, as seen 
in the recent 2014 Chinese Stock Market, a high figure of RESTATE will lead to 
losses in firm equity valuations (Ma et al., 2014). Therefore, it can be assumed that a 
low figure of FR issued indicates higher AQ reports issued throughout the years.  
The three different measures used to define AQ are distinctive, and attempts to 
capture different aspects of AQ.  The purpose for pulling in DACC into the model, is 
to help reflect purely the entity’s choices of reporting earnings alone, hence proxies 
for earnings quality (Keefe, 2016). DACC captures auditor’s behavior, which in this 
case, is driven by the management’s conduct. Similarly, FR is usually issued when a 
significant and material error has been found from previous audit reports. The 
company is required to restate previously issued financial statements, and correct the 
misstatement. Therefore, there is an assumption from investors, that FR is 
accompanied by material weaknesses in an entity’s internal control (Ernst & Young 
LLP, 2015). RESTATE captures important clients’ internal control and audit quality, 
as well as the management’s behavior in complying with accounting standards. 
Lastly, MAO is driven by auditor’s own behavior towards important client when 
issuing audit reports. This may capture to an extent the current year’s market forces, 
such as competitiveness of the auditing industry– the more competitive the industry 
is, auditors may be less conservative.  
 
4.2 Client Importance 
The test variable, Client Importance, is measured through the percentage of a 
client’s audit fees (CI_FEE) relative to the total revenue generated by that auditor 
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through auditing services (Chen, Sun, and Wu, 2010). This definition is based on the 
assumption that a client’s level of importance is dependent on its size, which in turn, 
affects their affordability in allocating monetary resources to external auditing 
services. In effect, the following equation is used to calculate each client’s level of 
importance to their respective external auditor: 
CI_FEE = (ABC company’s audit fees / Auditor X’s total audit revenue) *100% 
In order to eliminate the effect of biased audit fees and discounts given, the 
thesis will also use the client’s total assets (CI_ASSETS) to measure client 
importance (Chen, Sun, and Wu, 2010). As mentioned by Chen(2010), using 
CI_ASSETS as a measurement of the test variable is appropriate, since a major 
factor considered by audit partner when setting its audit fee, is based on client’s total 
assets. 
 
4.3 Model Specification 
This thesis runs three separate regressions for the three jurisdictions when 
investigating the relationship between client importance and AQ.  Through 
separating the regressions, the effect of the control variables is more direct and 
specific to its respective dependent variable, as well as reducing regression biasness 
between the three jurisdictions (Chan and Wu, 2011). Furthermore, separating the 
jurisdictions into three regressions allow fewer restrictions in differentiating and 
defining the regression slopes and the error structures. The coefficients of the 
regression can also be compared easily. 
The focal purpose of the thesis is to examine whether there is a relationship 
between client importance and audit quality in the socialist legal system, the 
common law and the civil law jurisdictions. Three alternative measures are used to 
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determine the audit quality. Below defines an estimated regression model on AQ, 
measured by modified audit opinion (MAO). Model (1) estimates relationship 
between MAO and client importance with the regression (Romanus, 2007): 
MAO = β0 + β1 *CI_FEE (CI_ASSETS) +β2* neweffort +β3* Big4  
 +β4*auditor_change +β5* size +β6* loss +β7* growth +β8* lev  
+β9* sales_volatility +β10* age +β11* boardmeeting + ε 
  
From model (1), the dependent variable is substituted by one of the three 
measures of AQ: (MAO), while Client Importance is measured by CI_FEE or 
CI_ASSETS, which play as two direct independent variables on AQ. Client 
importance (CI_FEE) measures whether the auditor is economically dependent on 
the audit client. Since it is assumed that the client’s size is the primary driver of audit 
fees, the thesis proxies CI_FEE as the percentage of fees generated by one client 
relative to the total fees generated by the audit firm’s all clients. Similarly, client 
importance (CI_ASSETS) is measured by the percentage of audited assets of one 
client relative to the total audited assets by the audit firm.  This measurement is 
based on the assumption that clients with higher total assets values tend to pay higher 
audit fees due to its complex business nature and increased audit risk. Model (1) 
therefore includes such independent variables which are shown in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The variable “neweffort” is included in the regression model, and differs from 
CI_ASSET, as neweffort is calculated as audit fee divided by total asset of a client; 
while CI_ASSET is calculated by a client’s total assets divided by the total of all 
clients’ assets audited by an audit firm. Hence, neweffort shows how much audit fee 
is needed for every unit of client’s assets, reflecting its business complexity and audit 
effort required.  
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“Big4” is a dummy variable, where the value 1 is given when one of the Big 4 
auditors is engaged; 0 otherwise while  “auditor_change” is a dummy variable which 
controls for opinion shopping by clients within the auditing industry in that 
jurisdiction, taking into account the level of difficulty for an important client to 
switch auditors. Switching auditors from one year to another denotes 1, while no 
change of external auditor denotes 0. A significant negative coefficient of 
“auditor_change” suggests poorer AQ when changes occur, as it reduces audit 
reporting persistence. Likewise, companies may have been unsatisfied with their 
previously received MAOs, hence wanted to switch auditors for opinion shopping 
(Chen et al., 2015). 
The variable “Size” is used to control for different company sizes. This is due to 
the fact that large sized companies have the capability to offer better deals with their 
auditors, hence creating a higher dependency on the client. To eliminate the effect of 
some companies prefer holding liquid assets such as inventory or cash, the thesis 
includes only the client’s non-current assets in “size”.  
“Loss” is also included as a dummy variable, to take into account of companies 
not making a profit (profit of < 0) in the twelve-month period. With an assumption 
that auditors will be more likely to issue a going-concern audit opinion for loss 
making companies, managers will have higher motivation to manipulate financial 
figures. Earnings quality and audit quality therefore decreases, where a negative 
coefficient of “loss” suggests poorer AQ. 
“Growth” takes into account different company’s growth rate and operation 
efficiencies. Growth = (Assets year t – Assets year t-1) / (Assets year t-1) 
“Lev” is used because a higher leverage ratio indicates a higher risk of violating 
its debt covenants, hence increasing its probability of earnings management and 
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bankruptcy; Lev is also used to control for the client’s financial risk.  Lev = Debt / 
Total assets. A significantly positive coefficient for Lev indicates poorer AQ under 
RESTATE and DACC, while a negative Lev coefficient indicates poorer AQ under 
MAO.  
“Sales_volatility” controls the growth and the volatility of the entity’s yearly 
sales. The thesis uses the standard deviation of last three years’ sales in defining 
sales_volatility. 
“Age” is the natural logarithm of the number of years the entity has been listed 
in its respective stock exchange. It is predicted that the operating performance of a 
listed company tends to deteriorate after the year of IPO, and will have incentives to 
manage its earnings (Chen, Chen, and Su, 2001). Since some companies are newly 
listed, and to eliminate the result of having a 0 value, age =natural logarithm of 
(years of company being publicly listed + 1). 
“Boardmeeting” is the natural logarithm of the number of board meetings the 
management has in a particular year. Since some companies may not have held any 
meetings, and to eliminate the result of having a 0 value, boardmeeting = natural 
logarithm (number of board meetings per annum + 1). 
As MAO increases, AQ increases accordingly. This is due to the fact that 
auditors who strive for high audit quality reports will have the propensity to issue 
more modified audit opinions when faced with uncertainties (DeFond, Wong and Li, 
1999). The relationship between CI_FEE or CI_ASSETS, and MAO, is expected to 
be positive under common law jurisdiction. The thesis assumes that if the client is 
more important to an audit firm, auditors will tend to be more conservative and 
unbiased in their audit reports, driving up the number of MAOs issued by auditors. 
This is due to the fact that high audit fee (CI_FEE) and larger clients (high 
32	
	
CI_ASSETS) attract more scrutiny and attention from the market, from investors, 
and from regulatory bodies. Hence, in order to stay away from legal proceedings, 
reputable auditors are more motivated to act diligently.  
 
Model (2) tests the relationship between client importance and RESTATE, with 
a regression model. MAO and RESTATE are inversely related, as the higher the 
MAO, higher the AQ, while higher the RESTATE, the lower the AQ will be. 
Nonetheless, both RESTATE and +DACC have very similar independent variables, 
where: 
RESTATE = β0 +β1 *CI_FEE (CI_ASSETS) +β2* neweffort +β3* Big4 
+β4*auditor_change +β5* size +β6* loss +β7* growth +β8* lev  
+β9* sales_volatility +β10* age +β11* boardmeeting + ε 
 
The dependent variable, RESTATE, is a dummy variable. It indicates whether a 
company or the auditor has discovered errors and mistakes in previously issued 
financial statement, hence amend and disclose such restatements to its stakeholders. 
If restatement is found and amended, 1 is given to the client’s year, 0 otherwise.  
As MAO and RESTATE are negatively correlated, the thesis hypothesizes that 
important clients in common law jurisdictions tend to receive less RESTATE, 
indicating higher AQ. 
 
Model (3) tests the relationship between client importance and DACC, with a 
regression model, where: 
positive_DACC = β0 + β1 *CI_FEE (CI_ASSETS) +β2* neweffort +β3* Big4 
+β4*auditor_change +β5* size +β6* loss +β7* growth +β8* lev  
+β9* sales_volatility +β10* age +β11* boardmeeting +β12* lag_DACC + ε 
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“Lag_DACC” is adopted from the Modified Jones Model, which stated that the 
origins of different revenue would bring a variety of operating capital, causing 
changes in accruals and perhaps earnings management (Chen, 2010). Lag_DACC is 
included to isolate discretionary accruals with extreme performances, among the 
sample firms (Beneish, 1997).  Therefore, 
lag_DACC = DAi,t – 1,  where  
DAi = Tai,t/Ai,t-1-{α1 (1/Ai,t-1) + α2[(ΔREVi – ΔRECi)/ Ai,t-1] + α3 (PPEi / Ai,t-1)} 
In terms of independent variables based on government and political influences, 
previous literature established a relationship that the audit quality in some of the 
SOE firms in the Mainland China  are affected by significant political influences 
(Chan et al, 2006). Although some companies are politically connected with civil 
governments and are able to obtain favorable audit opinions, companies under the 
common-law governments may be susceptible to detailed investigation and financial 
scrutiny from the regulatory bodies.  
By focusing the investigation in Asia, while comparing the legal system 
between civil law and common law societies, the sample firms used to measure AQ 
for this thesis will base only on publicly listed companies between the years 2008 to 
2013 across the three locales. During the collection of samples, Hong Kong’s 
financial statements are collected manually through their audit reports on their 
company websites and from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Main Board database. 
Taiwan’s financial data are collected from the Taiwan Economic Journal Database 
(TEJ), while Mainland China’s financial data are collected from the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and ShenZhen Stock Exchange from China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR), and Winds Database.  
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Since indirect independent variables (such as the different locale’s economic 
and GDP growth, government and political influences, and auditor’s respective 
market shares) are not yet taken into account, the sensitivity test in the next section 
will further elaborate on it. The SPSS statistics software’s natural log for values will 
be used to transform some data, while the STATA software will be used to integrate 
various variables together in order to run the regression.  
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Chapter 5 Descriptive Statistics and Main Results 
5.1   Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 (Panel A HK; Panel B Mainland China; Panel C Taiwan) presents the 
descriptive statistics for the test variable, client importance (CI_FEE, CI_ASSETS), 
and the dependent variable AQ (DACC, MAO, RESTATE). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The variable RESTATE has a mean value of 0.017 for HK, 0.024 for Mainland 
China, and 0.013 for Taiwan. This indicates that on average, 1.7% of the listed 
companies in HK, 2.4% of Mainland China’s listed companies, and 1.3% of 
Taiwan’s listed companies, had to restate their financial statements from one year to 
another. It is expected that HK’s restatement percentage is less than that of Mainland 
China’s, however, it is interesting to see that Taiwan (as a civil law jurisdiction), has 
a lower percentage than HK. This may be due to the fact that HK’s accounting 
standards has had significant and numerous changes in recent years, namely 2008-
2013.  
Similarly, the mean value for DACC for HK, Mainland China, and Taiwan, is 
9.4%, 8%, and 5.7%, respectively. As a high DACC indicates lower AQ, HK’s high 
percentage of discretionary accrual of 9.4% is unanticipated. However, it is expected 
to see that Mainland China’s 8% DACC is higher than Taiwan’s 5.7%.  
On the other hand, the mean value of MAO for companies in HK, Mainland 
China, and Taiwan, is 3.9%, 5.4%, and 57%. As higher MAO indicates higher AQ, it 
is surprising to see that HK has a significantly lower MAO percentage than Mainland 
China’s MAO, while Taiwan has exceeded our expectations. A justification for HK’s 
low MAO, indicating low AQ, may be the fact that during the sample years used, HK 
was facing an economic downturn. As more than half of HK’s listed companies are 
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headquartered in Mainland China, in order to attract and retain such important 
Chinese clients, HK auditors may be more lenient towards the clients. Taiwan’s 
significantly high MAO of 57%, is due to the fact that auditors in Taiwan may issue 
a “Modified Unqualified Audit Opinion”, if one of the seven scenarios are satisfied 
according to Taiwan’s Statement of Audit Standard (SAS) 33 (Lai et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the mean value of Taiwan’s annual “boardmeeting” of 2.110 and 
Mainland China’s 2.261, is slightly larger than that of HK’s 1.997. Mainland China’s 
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies states that “board of directors 
shall meet periodically and shall convene interim meetings timely” (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, 2002), while Taiwan’s Regulations Governing Procedure 
for Board of Directors Meetings of Public Companies states that “A board of 
directors shall meet at least quarterly, which shall be set out in the rules of procedure” 
(Taiwan Stock Exchange, 2012). If the quorum of one-half of all the directors are not 
present, the chair shall recall a meeting thereafter. This may imply that HK’s 
corporate governance policy is less stringent and procedural. Thus, Mainland China 
and Taiwan Stock Exchange’s rules and regulations on corporate governance may be 
an explanation to the slightly more annual “boardmeeting”. 
 
5.2 Univariate Tests 
Table 3 lists the Univariate Test results. The thesis’s large sample data and result 
expresses the P-value as significant, if **p < 0.05 and *** p<0.01. The P-value of 
<0.1 is classified as marginal significance.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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It is evident that there is a significant difference between HK and Taiwan’s 
MAO. With the t-value of -0.531, there is a 1% significant level difference between 
the two jurisdictions. This implies that important clients in HK obtain less MAOs, 
than those in Taiwan. This does not satisfy H1, that important clients under a 
common law jurisdiction have higher quality audit reports under the measurement of 
MAO. Since HKICPA requires certain line items to be corrected and restated 
retrospectively, auditors must abide by the changes in accounting standards, as set 
out by HKICPA. Since the sample data are collected between the years of 2008 to 
2013, where HKICPA made numerous changes in accounting policies, such as 
HKSA 540’s Accounting estimates, and HKAS 18’s Revenue recognition, these may 
have affected my results in denoting a high RESTATE for important clients. In fact, 
this factor displays a limitation in this research study, as it was not possible to 
differentiate the source of auditor’s restatements. According to HKSA 560 and 
HKSA 710, other than stating in the Emphasis of Matter paragraph in the audit report, 
“auditor should issue a modified report on the current period financial statement, 
modified with respect to the corresponding figures included therein” (HKICPA, 
2005). In other words, auditors indicate the existence of auditor’s restatement, but 
may not necessarily state the reasons behind it.  
 
5.3 Regression Results 
Table 4 shows the main regression results. Given the HK table for MAO, I 
expected a positive coefficient with CI_FEE and CI_ASSETS, as higher MAO 
should be received from important clients.  With a p-value of 0.011 and 0.000 for 
CI_FEE and CI_ASSETS respectively, these results gave me a 5% and 1% level of 
significance. Therefore, MAO satisfies my hypothesis. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
Moreover, HK’s RESTATE has a p-value of 0.021 with CI_FEE, giving a 5% 
significant level. RESTATE has a p-value of 0.001 with CI_ASSETS, giving a 1% 
significant level.  
With a positive coefficient of CI_FEE and CI_ASSET with RESTATE, it 
indicates that as important client’s audit fee increases, the probability of financial 
statement restatement increases, which decreases the AQ. This does not support my 
Hypothesis, as I expected a negative coefficient for RESTATE in HK. A justification 
for more restatements in HK is due to the difference of the rule of law between 
common law and civil law, where noncompliance of accounting standards and its 
monetary damages are interpreted differently between the different jurisdictions. HK, 
Mainland China, and Taiwan’s principles governing damages for the breach are 
compensatory instead of punitive, indicating that negligent auditors are only required 
to compensate the “actual” damages to the claimant. This being said, the 
compensation is equal to the loss caused by the breach, provided that the loss was 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the event, and that the plaintiff could not have 
avoided such risk. However, common law differs from civil law’s definition in 
“breaching” the law: in order for the claimant to successfully sue HK auditors, the 
auditor’s breach must clearly have been the operative and practical cause of the loss, 
not the event that “merely created an opportunity for loss to be suffered”. This 
indicates that it is more difficult for claimants in common law societies to demand 
for compensation from negligent auditors, which directly induces auditor’s behavior 
in being less conservative in issuing unmodified audit opinions.   
For the measure of AQ using positive_DACC, the relationship between 
positive_DACC with CI_ASSETS has a p-value of 0.040, yielding a 5% significance. 
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This suggests that important clients in HK, as measured by their total assets, do tend 
to manage their earnings upwards, reducing its earnings quality. 
For the Mainland China and Taiwan, a positive coefficient is obtained between 
RESTATE and CI_FEE/ CI_ASSETS. This shows that important clients in Mainland 
China and Taiwan tend to receive more restatements, indicating lower AQ. With 1% 
significant level in Mainland China and a 5% significant level in Taiwan, this 
supports H. The results of Mainland China and Taiwan, both shows that MAO and 
DACC are not significantly related to CI_FEE or CI_ASSETS. In spite of this, 
RESTATE is positively and significantly correlated to important clients in Mainland 
China and Taiwan, implying low AQ. This satisfies the Hypothesis, where in civil 
law jurisdictions and in the socialist legal jurisdiction, publicly listed company’s 
audit quality decreases, as auditor’s economic dependence on important client 
increases. 
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Chapter 6 Robustness Test& Sensitivity Analysis 
As stated in Chapter 4.3, the thesis has separated the three jurisdictions into 
three different regression analyses. In a sensitivity test I combine the sample of the 
three jurisdictions and run the regression to test the association between Client 
Importance and Audit Quality as follows:  
 
AQ = α0 +α1 *CI_FEE (CI_ASSETS)+ α2 *HK + α3 *Taiwan  
+ α4 *HK*CI_FEE (CI_ASSETS) + α5 *Taiwan*CI_FEE (CI_ASSETS)  
+ controlled variables 
 
where, 
AQ = MAO; or RESTATE; or positive_DACC 
The above combined AQ regression uses Mainland China as a base/controlled 
group, as HK versus Mainland China/ Taiwan’s legal systems are vastly different, 
whereas Mainland China and Taiwan’s differences are limited to the implementation 
of the law. Therefore, α4 compares CI and AQ between HK and Mainland China, 
while α5 compares CI and AQ between Taiwan and Mainland China.  
The results presented in Table 5 shows that there are no significant differences 
between HK, Mainland China, and Taiwan’s AQ in terms of RESTATE and 
positive_DACC. However, comparing HK to Mainland China under MAO, 
HK*CI_ASSETS yields a positive coefficient of 3.455 with p-value of 0.001, as well 
as a positive coefficient of 1.522 with p-value of 0.078, giving a 10% significance. 
This indicates that as compared to Mainland China, HK’s important clients tend to 
receive more MAO.   However, there is no significance difference between Taiwan 
and Mainland China. This result is generally consistent with those of separate 
regressions. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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The DACC from Table 2 are absolute values, where no direction of earnings 
management has been considered; only the degree of earnings management is 
investigated. To have a more in-depth investigation of the significance of DACC on 
client importance (CI_FEE / CI_ASSETS), a robustness test has been performed to 
take into account the direction and the degree of DACC simultaneously. The reason 
for examining the negative DACC in this sensitivity analysis is because companies 
may be inclined to manage its profits through deflating their earnings downwards for 
tax avoidance purposes or to smooth out revenues across several years. 
As shown in Table 6, under Taiwan’s civil law locale, the coefficient of signed 
DACC (DACC < 0) on client importance (CI_FEE) is -0.038, yielding a significant 
p-value of 0.001. This indicates that the more important the client is, in terms of 
audit fee, more earnings management and discretionary accrual was found in the 
financial statements. Audit quality therefore decreases. However, under the HK 
common law locale and the Mainland China’s socialist legal system locale, a p-value 
of 0.451 and 0.211 were respectively obtained, showing no significant relationship 
between client importance (CI_FEE) and negative DACC.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
To further support the significance and accuracy of the above results, a 
sensitivity test (Table 7) is conducted by including  four additional control variables: 
(a) LLP, a dummy variable that controls the different legal form of the CPA 
firms, such as limited liability or partnerships. Firth et al. (2012) find that auditors 
with unlimited liability are more conservative than their counterparts in issuing clean 
audit reports. 
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(b) MKTCON, the market concentration of auditors and their extent to which 
they are ‘controlling’ the auditing industry. This also reveals the intensity of the CPA 
firms’ competition within their locale. DeFond, Wong, and Li (1999) shows that 
larger auditors tend to report a higher proportion of modified opinions, perhaps due 
to potential significant reputational and litigation losses. Also, a higher concentration 
of auditors auditing listed companies in the market indicates market dominance, as 
well as their ability to influence the auditing industry. A high market concentration 
therefore indicates higher propensity of earnings management and low audit quality. 
(c) GDP, denotes the local GDP and its economic strength in a particular year in 
a specific locale. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) found that market development 
is associated with earnings quality and audit quality. For instance, if HK’s GDP falls 
in a particular year, while Mainland China’s GDP rises, companies are induced into 
moving to a thriving market, hence switching from HK auditors to Mainland auditors. 
In order for the weaker GDP HK to retain clients, HK auditors may therefore be 
inclined to be more lenient over their important clients, subsequently reducing AQ. 
Hence, lower GDP presumes to yield lower audit quality reports. This is especially 
valid for listed companies in HK since 2010, when the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
announced its decision on mutual recognition of the Mainland Chinese Accounting 
Standards and audit firms as one of its accepted accounting standards. 
(d) SOE, taking into account the political factors in Mainland China, where 
state-owned enterprises are owned, managed, and heavily influenced by the 
Government, who also appoints the SOE’s external auditors. It is therefore 
anticipated that SOEs are important clients in Mainland China, and they give rise to 
lower audit quality reports. 
43	
	
The abovementioned four variables are included in the sensitivity test, as 
auditors from different locales are motivated to treat their important clients 
differently, mainly due to auditor’s legal liabilities, market and economic factors, and 
political considerations. After all, “the supply of audit quality is a function of both 
the auditor’s incentives for independence and their competency” (DeFond and Zhang, 
2014). 
As shown in Table 7, upon including MKTCON and the GDP variables in the 
regression for the sample of HK, a coefficient of 1.782 (p-value of 0.021**) and 
0.017 (p-value of 0.084*) is obtained on client importance (CI_ASSETS) for 
RESTATE and positive_DACC, respectively. This indicates that the more important 
the client is, in terms of CI_ASSETS, the number of financial report restatements 
(RESTATE) and earnings management (+DACC) increases.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Moreover, Mainland China’s sensitivity tests shows that there is a significant 
relationship between client importance (CI_ASSETS) and RESTATE, with a 
coefficient of 1.092 (p-value of 0.028), indicating that audit quality decreases as 
client importance increases.  
Lastly, Taiwan’s sensitivity test result shows the coefficients on CI_FEE and 
CL_ASSETS are not significant for all three measures of audit quality. However,  
MKTCON has a positive coefficient and a p-value of 0.002, giving a 1% significant 
relationship with RESTATE. This indicates that auditors with higher market 
dominance tend to be “less conservative” in issuing clean audit reports, which 
increases RESTATE and lowers AQ. On the other hand, GDP has a negative 
coefficient of 12.157, a p-value of 0.000 with a 1% significant relationship with 
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MAO. This contracts to my presumption that lower GDP yields lower audit quality 
reports. In the case of Taiwan, low GDP index gave a higher MAO, hence increasing 
AQ. With the low GDP growth, unemployment rate increases, and the labor market 
deteriorates in Taiwan throughout the years, investors are reluctant to commit into 
risky investments. As such, in order to maintain market stability and reduce 
economic contraction, auditors are inclined to be more conservative when issuing 
audit reports, with a hope to regain market confidence from public investors.  
The main test from Table 4 included financial institutions in my sample firms. 
However, considering the fact that financial institutions are characterized and 
classified into different industries among the different locales, a sensitivity test 
(Table 8) is conducted, where the three jurisdiction’s listed financial institutions are 
excluded from the sample data. Nonetheless, the result is still consistent with Table 4.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
The thesis analyses and directly compares the audit quality for important clients 
in jurisdictions with different legal systems simultaneously in one investigation. 
Using data from Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan during 2008-2013, I find 
that in HK, Mainland China and Taiwan, the more important the client is to its 
auditor, the lower the audit quality, as measured by the restatement of financial 
statements (RESTATE). However, in Hong Kong, the more important the client is to 
its auditor, the higher the quality of audit report as measured by modified audit 
opinion (MAO), indicating that Hong Kong auditors are conservative in issuing 
MAO.  Client Importance and positive_DACC has no significant relationship under 
all three jurisdictions.  
The fact that Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are under the “one 
nation with different systems”, history and political factors have shaped their legal 
systems differently. As such, the thesis provides evidence that different legal systems 
play a direct role in influencing audit quality.  
Furthermore, I do take into consideration that auditors in different locale are 
subject to different external influences, such as auditor’s legal liability, market and 
economic factors, as well as political considerations. After including the external 
influences (MKTCON, GDP, LLP, SOE) into the sensitivity analysis, results are still 
consistent to my main tests. Regulators and local standard setters should be aware of 
the different institutional environments that affect audit quality for their important 
clients. 
Nonetheless, the thesis does have limitations. Other than the four variables that 
are taken into account in the sensitivity analysis (MKTCON, GDP, LLP, SOE), other 
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external factors may also affect the relationship between client importance and AQ, 
which were not included in the regression investigation. 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
Variables Explanation  
AQ Audit Quality indicates whether the control and content of auditor’s 
report on each engagement is high. AQ is measured by Discretionary 
accruals, Modified Audit Opinions, and Financial Restatements. 
DACC Discretionary (Abnormal) Accruals is an absolute value, which reveals 
the existence of accrual-based earnings management in a company. It is 
measured by the total accruals (in year t) less predicted accruals,  
where predicted accruals =  
NDAi = α1 (1/Ai) + α2[(ΔREVi – ΔRECi)/ Ai] + α3 (PPEi / Ai) 
Where  
total accruals =  
[ (earnings before extraordinary items in year t) – (operating cash flows 
in year t) ] / (total assets in year t-1) 
A The total assets of firm i in year t 
NDAi The non-discretionary accruals of firm i in year t 
ΔREVi The change in revenue of firm i in year t 
ΔRECi The change in accounts receivables of firm i in year t 
PPEi The gross value of fixed assets for firm i in year t 
MAO Modified Audit Opinions contributes to the measurement of AQ. It 
indicates whether the auditor have issued a modified audit opinion to 
their client, including “Unqualified opinion with Emphasis of Matter”, 
“Qualified opinion with Emphasis of Matter”, “Qualified opinion”, and 
“Disclaimer opinion”  
RESTATE Financial restatement is a dummy variable, contributing to the 
measurement of AQ. It indicates whether a company or an auditor 
discovers an error made in the financial statement in the previous year, 
hence needing to disclose such amendment to its stakeholders. If there is 
a restatement from the previous year, 1 will be given to the firm   
CI_FEE A measure of Client importance, on whether a particular client 
contributes a significant percentage of income for the auditor. It is 
measured by a listed company’s audit fees, divided by the auditor’s total 
audit revenue in a given year 
CI_ASSETS A measure of Client importance, on whether larger clients (with more 
total assets) affects AQ  
neweffort (%) Calculated by audit fee divided by total asset of client, showing whether 
auditors charge clients a higher rate if they are larger in scale. This 
variable is in percentage term 
Big4 A dummy variable, where the value 1 is given when one of the Big 4 
auditors is engaged; 0 otherwise 
Auditor_change A dummy variable controlling for opinion shopping by clients within 
the auditing industry in that jurisdiction, taking into account the level of 
difficulty for an important client to switch auditors.  Switching auditors 
from one year to another denotes 1, while no change of external auditor 
denotes 0 
size A natural logarithm variable to control different entity sizes, taking into 
account only the client’s non-current assets 
Loss  A dummy variable to take into account the company is not making a 
profit (profit of < 0) in the twelve-month period 
Growth  Accounting for different company’s growth rate and operation 
efficiencies.  
Growth = (Assets year t – Assets year t-1) / (Assets year t-1) 
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Table 1  (continued) 
Lev  To control for the client’s financial risk, because a higher Debt to Total 
Asset ratio indicates a higher risk of violating its debt covenants, hence 
increasing its probability of earnings management. 
Lev = Debt / Total assets 
 
sales_volatility Controls the growth and the volatility of the entity’s yearly sales, and 
uses the standard deviation of last three years’ sales 
age The natural logarithm of the number of years the entity has been listed in 
its respective stock exchange 
age = years of company being publicly listed + 1 
boardmeeting A natural logarithm of the number of board meetings the management has 
in a particular year 
boardmeeting = number of board meetings per annum + 1 
lag_DACC Lagged discretionary accrual is included to isolate discretionary accruals 
with extreme performances 
lag_DACC = DA i,t – 1, 
where 
 LLP A dummy variable, controlling different organizational and legal form of 
the CPA firms, such as limited liability form or partnership formations. 
Limited Liability Partnership audit firms denotes 1, while other forms of 
organizations denote 0 
MKTCON The market concentration of auditors and their extent to which they are 
‘controlling’ the auditing industry. It also reveals the intensity of the CPA 
firms’ competition within their locale. This variable is in percentage term, 
where, 
MKTCON = total audit revenue for an individual audit firm / total audit 
revenue for all audit firms in its respective jurisdiction 
GDP Accounting for the local GDP and its economic strength in a particular 
year in a specific locale 
SOE Taking into account the political factors in Mainland China, where state-
owned enterprises are owned and managed by the Central Government 
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Table 2 
Description Statistics 
Panel A: Hong Kong 
 
 mean SD p25 p50 p75 
RESTATE 0.017 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MAO 0.039 0.194 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DACC 0.094 0.124 0.024 0.055 0.113 
positive_DACC 0.047 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.053 
CI_fee 0.057 0.163 0.003 0.008 0.026 
CI_assets 0.045 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.005 
neweffort (%) 19.398 31.807 3.976 9.465 20.483 
Big4 0.487 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
auditorchange 0.079 0.270 0.000 0.000 0.000 
size 21.456 2.109 20.059 21.282 22.714 
loss 0.236 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.000 
growth 0.285 0.894 -0.012 0.107 0.277 
lev 0.473 0.374 0.242 0.423 0.622 
sales_volatility 0.265 0.496 0.046 0.115 0.266 
age 2.218 0.900 1.792 2.398 2.833 
boardmeeting (ln) 1.997 0.535 1.609 1.792 2.303 
lag_DACC 0.102 0.134 0.025 0.057 0.120 
 
Panel B: Mainland China 
 
 mean SD p25 p50 p75 
RESTATE 0.024 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MAO 0.054 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DACC 0.080 0.092 0.023 0.051 0.101 
positive_DACC 0.039 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.049 
CI_fee 0.044 0.088 0.008 0.019 0.041 
CI_assets 0.040 0.105 0.003 0.009 0.029 
neweffort (%) 3.835 4.859 1.382 2.530 4.459 
Big4 0.015 0.121 0.000 0.000 0.000 
auditorchange 0.134 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.000 
size 21.799 1.259 20.945 21.696 22.559 
loss 0.106 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.000 
growth 0.195 0.488 0.009 0.100 0.228 
lev 0.495 0.248 0.321 0.492 0.647 
sales_volatility 0.238 0.535 0.052 0.104 0.201 
age 2.149 0.779 1.792 2.485 2.708 
boardmeeting (ln) 2.261 0.320 2.079 2.303 2.485 
lag_DACC 0.087 0.155 0.023 0.052 0.102 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel C: Taiwan 
 
 mean SD p25 p50 p75 
RESTATE 0.013 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MAO 0.570 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DACC 0.057 0.056 0.017 0.040 0.078 
positive_DACC 0.028 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.038 
CI_fee 0.043 0.142 0.003 0.004 0.009 
CI_assets 0.030 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.002 
neweffort (%) 11.323 12.448 2.876 7.432 14.998 
Big4 0.103 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 
auditorchange 0.035 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 
size 15.410 1.713 14.230 15.112 16.201 
loss 0.231 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000 
growth 0.073 0.229 -0.044 0.036 0.139 
lev 0.436 0.190 0.298 0.429 0.556 
sales_volatility 0.190 0.208 0.066 0.127 0.227 
age 2.343 0.875 2.079 2.485 2.890 
boardmeeting (ln) 2.110 0.331 1.792 2.079 2.303 
lag_DACC 0.056 0.055 0.017 0.039 0.076 
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Table 3 
UnivariateTests 
Variables T-Test T-Test T-Test HK TW Mainland TW Mainland HK 
RESTATE 
0.017 0.013 0.024 0.013 0.024 0.017 
0.004* 
(0.059) 
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
MAO 
0.039 0.570 0.054 0.570 0.054 0.039 
-0.531*** 
(0.000) 
-0.516*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
positive_DACC 
0.047 0.028 0.039 0.028 0.039 0.047 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
CI_fee 
0.057 0.043 0.044 0.043 0.044 0.057 
0.014*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.613) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
CI_assets 
0.045 0.030 0.040 0.030 0.040 0.045 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005** 
(0.012) 
neweffort 
19.398 11.323 3.835 11.323 3.835 19.398 
8.075*** 
(0.000) 
-7.488*** 
(0.000) 
-15.563*** 
(0.000) 
Big4 
0.487 0.103 0.015 0.103 0.015 0.487 
0.384*** 
(0.000) 
-0.088*** 
(0.000) 
-0.472*** 
(0.000) 
auditorchange 
0.079 0.035 0.134 0.035 0.134 0.079 
0.044*** 
(0.000) 
0.099*** 
(0.000) 
0.056*** 
(0.000) 
size 
21.456 15.410 21.799 15.410 21.799 21.456 
6.047*** 
(0.000) 
6.390*** 
(0.000)  
0.343*** 
(0.000) 
loss 
0.236 0.231 0.106 0.231 0.106 0.236 
0.005 
(0.496) 
-0.125*** 
(0.000) 
-0.130*** 
(0.000) 
growth 
0.195 0.073 0.285 0.073 0.285 0.195 
0.212*** 
(0.000) 
0.121*** 
(0.000) 
-0.090*** 
(0.000) 
lev 
0.473 0.436 0.495 0.436 0.495 0.473 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
0.059*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
sales_volatility 
0.265 0.190 0.238 0.190 0.238 0.265 
0.075*** 
(0.000) 
0.048*** 
(0.000) 
-0.027*** 
(0.000) 
age 
2.218 2.343 2.149 2.343 2.149 2.218 
-0.125*** 
(0.000) 
-0.194*** 
(0.000) 
-0.069*** 
(0.000) 
boardmeeting 
1.997 2.110 2.261 2.110 2.261 1.997 
-0.113*** 
(0.000) 
0.151*** 
(0.000) 
0.264*** 
(0.000) 
*, **, *** Denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively.
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Table 4 
Main Tests for the Association between Client Importance and Audit Quality in 
Three Jurisdictions 
Panel A: Hong Kong 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE positive_DACC positive_DACC 
CI_FEE 1.235**  1.884**  0.008  
 (0.011)  (0.021)  (0.332)  
CI_ASSETS  1.761***  2.530***  0.020** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.040) 
neweffort -0.000 0.000 -0.021* -0.021* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.980) (0.915) (0.074) (0.082) (0.146) (0.125) 
Big4 -0.768*** -0.746*** 0.477 0.546 0.000 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.249) (0.189) (0.988) (0.837) 
auditor_change 0.536** 0.556** -0.732 -0.700 0.001 0.001 
 (0.045) (0.037) (0.350) (0.373) (0.819) (0.816) 
size -0.105 -0.123 -0.008 -0.016 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.277) (0.207) (0.958) (0.918) (0.464) (0.418) 
loss 1.009*** 1.009*** 0.775* 0.806* -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.064) (0.360) (0.373) 
growth 0.017 0.001 0.153 0.140 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.824) (0.987) (0.257) (0.297) (0.000) (0.000) 
lev 2.187*** 2.198*** 1.519*** 1.544*** 0.007 0.007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) (0.117) (0.117) 
sales_volatility 0.214 0.228 0.047 0.044 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.170) (0.138) (0.885) (0.892) (0.000) (0.000) 
age 0.122 0.135 -0.549** -0.584** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.493) (0.453) (0.015) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
boardmeeting 0.663*** 0.675*** -1.028** -1.071** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.011) (0.917) (0.899) 
lag_DACC     0.026** 0.025** 
     (0.027) (0.032) 
Constant -3.875* -3.626 -1.495 -1.238 0.064** 0.066** 
 (0.087) (0.111) (0.693) (0.745) (0.029) (0.025) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2935 2935 1829 1829 2905 2905 
Pseudo(Adjusted) 
R2 0.313 0.318 0.103 0.116 0.083 0.084 
Panel B: Mainland China 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE positive_DACC,  positive_DACC,  
CI_FEE 0.104  1.530***  0.006  
 (0.866)  (0.006)  (0.493)  
CI_ASSETS  -0.104  1.462***  0.011 
  (0.866)  (0.001)  (0.159) 
Neweffort 0.063*** 0.063*** -0.025 -0.025 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.189) (0.185) (0.069) (0.068) 
Big4 . . -0.717 -0.657 -0.003 -0.003 
 . . (0.480) (0.518) (0.633) (0.676) 
auditorchange 0.532*** 0.532*** 0.214 0.216 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.261) (0.255) (0.631) (0.630) 
Size -0.665*** -0.662*** -0.223*** -0.245*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.004) (0.354) (0.267) 
Loss 1.344*** 1.345*** 0.950*** 0.959*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
growth -0.871*** -0.873*** -0.091 -0.098 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.650) (0.625) (0.000) (0.000) 
lev 3.541*** 3.541*** 0.714*** 0.708*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
sales_volatility -0.054 -0.054 -0.116 -0.110 0.003 0.003 
 (0.720) (0.719) (0.514) (0.537) (0.121) (0.118) 
age 0.620*** 0.621*** 0.244 0.250 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.109) (0.119) (0.120) 
boardmeeting 0.361* 0.364* 0.517** 0.522** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) 
lag_DACC     0.023*** 0.023*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 6.519*** 6.460*** 0.048 0.513 0.047** 0.051** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.980) (0.785) (0.043) (0.029) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8963 8963 9006 9006 6897 6897 
Pseudo(Adjusted)R2 0.414 0.414 0.080 0.081 0.122 0.122 
Panel C: Taiwan 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE positive_DACC positive_DACC 
CI_FEE 0.756  2.680**  -0.011  
 (0.105)  (0.019)  (0.166)  
CI_ASSETS  0.574  1.927  -0.003 
  (0.230)  (0.167)  (0.692) 
neweffort -0.033** -0.033** -0.086 -0.092 -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.257) (0.211) (0.042) (0.049) 
Big4 0.186 0.184 3.643*** 3.481*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.358) (0.364) (0.000) (0.000) (0.784) (0.810) 
auditorchange 0.873** 0.920** 1.941 2.335** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.034) (0.025) (0.134) (0.043) (0.986) (0.872) 
size 0.064 0.058 -0.903** -0.928** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.315) (0.360) (0.013) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
loss 0.088 0.087 2.123*** 2.315*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.591) (0.596) (0.003) (0.001) (0.575) (0.598) 
growth -0.938*** -0.948*** -0.031 0.228 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.981) (0.867) (0.000) (0.000) 
lev -0.337 -0.310 1.045 0.120 0.004 0.004 
 (0.385) (0.424) (0.598) (0.950) (0.550) (0.559) 
sales_volatility -0.765* -0.755* 3.288** 2.987** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.017) (0.028) (0.001) (0.001) 
age 0.454*** 0.456*** -0.286 -0.276 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.592) (0.605) (0.682) (0.704) 
boardmeeting 0.326* 0.338* 2.329*** 2.284*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.065) (0.055) (0.002) (0.002) (0.847) (0.774) 
lag_DACC     0.057** 0.056** 
     (0.028) (0.030) 
Constant -1.871 -1.795 6.865 7.768 0.101*** 0.099*** 
 (0.121) (0.136) (0.221) (0.163) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1812 1812 513 513 1358 1358 
Adjusted (Pseudo) R2 0.168 0.167 0.384 0.365 0.128 0.127 
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Table 5 
Combined Regression for the Three Jurisdictions’ Association between  
            Client Importance and Audit Quality 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE positive_DACC positive_DACC 
HK*CI_FEE 1.522*  -0.765  -0.000  
 (0.078)  (0.579)  (0.974)  
TW*CI_FEE -0.173  1.001  -0.016  
 (0.851)  (0.300)  (0.241)  
HK*CI_ 
ASSETS 
 3.455***  0.031  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.980)  (0.870) 
TW*CI_ 
ASSETS 
 1.158  -0.084  -0.013 
  (0.290)  (0.941)  (0.298) 
HK 0.198 0.122 -0.878* -0.926** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.561) (0.714) (0.060) (0.043) (0.454) (0.363) 
TW 3.011*** 3.023*** 0.573 0.550 -0.018*** -0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.626) (0.639) (0.010) (0.005) 
CI_FEE -0.327  1.450**  0.006  
 (0.581)  (0.015)  (0.545)  
CI_ASSETS  -1.563*  1.313***  0.012 
  (0.056)  (0.006)  (0.138) 
neweffort -0.010** -0.009* -0.021* -0.021* 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.041) (0.071) (0.058) (0.074) (0.002) (0.002) 
big4 -0.561** -0.546** -0.392 -0.476 -0.004* -0.003 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.247) (0.185) (0.091) (0.186) 
auditor_change 0.484*** 0.485*** 0.164 0.178 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.360) (0.316) (0.990) (0.993) 
size -
0.355*** 
-0.345*** -0.167** -0.184*** -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.009) (0.087) (0.046) 
loss 0.875*** 0.878*** 0.882*** 0.894*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
growth -0.169 -0.185 -0.005 -0.016 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.138) (0.106) (0.962) (0.885) (0.000) (0.000) 
lev 3.005*** 2.998*** 0.809*** 0.781*** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.418) (0.421) 
sales_volatility -0.154 -0.142 -0.051 -0.049 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.288) (0.316) (0.748) (0.757) (0.000) (0.000) 
age 0.597*** 0.594*** 0.003 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.982) (0.997) (0.001) (0.001) 
boardmeeting 0.319** 0.324** 0.098 0.100 0.003 0.003 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.596) (0.588) (0.108) (0.111) 
lag_DACC     0.029*** 0.029*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.092 -0.123 -0.543 -0.124 0.056*** 0.059*** 
 (0.943) (0.924) (0.753) (0.942) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 14373 14373 13037 13037 11764 11764 
Pseudo(Adjusted) R2 0.471 0.472 0.096 0.095 0.100 0.100 
*, **, *** Denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Client Importance and Audit Quality based on Negative DACC 
 Mainland Hong Kong Taiwan 
 DACC<0 DACC<0 DACC<0 DACC<0 DACC<0 DACC<0 
CI_FEE 0.025  0.015  -0.038***  
 (0.211)  (0.451)  (0.001)  
CI_ASSETS  0.011  0.001  -0.033*** 
  (0.518)  (0.966)  (0.009) 
neweffort -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000* -0.000* -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.098) (0.014) (0.015) 
Big4 -0.024* -0.023* -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.092) (0.098) (0.705) (0.586) (0.607) (0.583) 
Auditor_change -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016 -0.015 0.003 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.169) (0.178) (0.727) (0.707) 
Size 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.353) (0.480) 
Loss -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.015* -0.015* 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.052) (0.855) (0.847) 
Growth -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 0.020* 0.020* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) (0.066) 
Lev -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.057*** -0.057*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.992) (0.933) 
sales_volatility -0.013** -0.013** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.028** -0.029** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.019) 
Age -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.286) (0.294) (0.623) (0.615) (0.570) (0.660) 
boardmeeting 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.670) (0.661) (0.490) (0.513) (0.148) (0.106) 
lag_DACC 0.014 0.014 -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.123*** -0.119*** 
 (0.210) (0.207) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -0.284*** -0.284*** -0.260*** -0.262*** -0.013 -0.018 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.782) (0.697) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3628 3628 2044 2044 732 732 
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.177 0.169 0.168 0.210 0.204 
*, **, *** Denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Sensitivity Test on Liability, Market Competitiveness, Economic Development, 
and Political Considerations 
 
Panel A: Hong Kong 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE Positive_ 
DACC 
Positive_DACC 
CI_FEE 0.493  1.056  0.008  
 (0.306)  (0.223)  (0.333)  
CI_ASSETS  1.082*
* 
 1.782**  0.017* 
  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.084) 
neweffort 0.003 0.003 -0.019 -0.019 0.000 0.000 
 (0.329) (0.321) (0.123) (0.118) (0.424) (0.389) 
Big4 -0.944** -0.937** 0.677 0.687 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.302) (0.286) (0.834) (0.875) 
MKTCON -2.195 -1.918 -5.352** -4.897* -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.262) (0.320) (0.047) (0.064) (0.862) (0.921) 
auditor_change 0.566** 0.570** -0.839 -0.828 0.005 0.005 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.283) (0.290) (0.340) (0.328) 
Size 0.084 0.063 0.076 0.058 -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.348) (0.483) (0.658) (0.734) (0.062) (0.052) 
Loss 1.011*** 1.011*** 0.738* 0.758* -0.005* -0.005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.094) (0.085) (0.100) (0.108) 
Growth -0.011 -0.019 0.114 0.108 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.878) (0.791) (0.405) (0.429) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lev 2.166*** 2.173*** 1.415** 1.458*** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.435) (0.432) 
sales_volatility 0.192 0.198 0.049 0.044 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.171) (0.155) (0.883) (0.894) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.031 0.029 -0.578** -0.618*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.841) (0.853) (0.012) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
boardmeeting 0.449*** 0.454*** -1.064** -1.091*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.009) (0.928) (0.938) 
GDP 0.882 0.896 6.355 6.304 0.055** 0.055** 
 (0.611) (0.605) (0.322) (0.325) (0.026) (0.024) 
lag_DACC     0.041*** 0.040*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -18.459 -18.265 -82.441 -81.377 -0.536* -0.541* 
 (0.392) (0.397) (0.300) (0.306) (0.082) (0.078) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3699 3699 1829 1829 3641 3641 
Adjusted (Pseudo) 
R2 0.313 0.316 0.113 0.122 0.051 0.051 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Mainland China 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE positive_DACC positive_DACC 
CI_FEE 0.185  1.015  0.001  
 (0.775)  (0.103)  (0.885)  
CI_ASSETS  -0.012  1.092**  0.006 
  (0.985)  (0.028)  (0.453) 
neweffort 0.055*** 0.055*** -0.019 -0.020 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.318) (0.297) (0.027) (0.030) 
Big4 0.701** 0.703** -0.504 -0.448 -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.343) (0.399) (0.044) (0.046) 
LLP 0.246 0.242 0.726** 0.733** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.331) (0.341) (0.015) (0.014) (0.808) (0.810) 
MKTCON -0.646 -0.839 -8.066*** -7.938*** -0.036 -0.029 
 (0.762) (0.687) (0.010) (0.009) (0.325) (0.409) 
auditor_change 0.504*** 0.505*** 0.174 0.174 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.368) (0.368) (0.635) (0.635) 
size -0.718*** -0.715*** -0.173* -0.197** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.058) (0.033) (0.630) (0.767) 
loss 1.344*** 1.345*** 0.918*** 0.922*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
growth -0.797*** -0.801*** -0.111 -0.112 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.580) (0.577) (0.000) (0.000) 
lev 3.550*** 3.550*** 0.679*** 0.677*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
sales_volatility -0.033 -0.033 -0.129 -0.123 0.003 0.003 
 (0.829) (0.828) (0.473) (0.494) (0.184) (0.180) 
age 0.661*** 0.661*** 0.274* 0.278* -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.088) (0.298) (0.304) 
boardmeeting 0.345* 0.348* 0.482** 0.485** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
GDP 0.219 0.227 -2.216*** -2.210*** -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.656) (0.644) (0.000) (0.000) (0.392) (0.396) 
SOE -0.040 -0.040 -0.074 -0.072 -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.759) (0.758) (0.634) (0.642) (0.049) (0.050) 
lag_DACC     0.022*** 0.022*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.554 2.375 33.647*** 34.058*** 0.104 0.107 
 (0.745) (0.762) (0.000) (0.000) (0.316) (0.302) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9037 9037 8951 8951 6870 6870 
Adjusted (Pseudo) R2 0.416 0.416 0.087 0.088 0.058 0.058 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Taiwan 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE positive_DACC positive_DACC 
CI_FEE -0.209  0.534  -0.006  
 (0.728)  (0.692)  (0.507)  
CI_ASSETS  -0.312  -1.068  0.005 
  (0.587)  (0.583)  (0.639) 
neweffort -0.028** -0.028** -0.028 -0.028 -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.676) (0.678) (0.032) (0.031) 
Big4 0.388 0.372 2.456 1.958 0.003 0.005 
 (0.191) (0.192) (0.111) (0.195) (0.624) (0.309) 
LLP -0.274 -0.296 1.559 1.410 0.006 0.005 
 (0.662) (0.636) (0.526) (0.519) (0.621) (0.648) 
MKTCON -3.532*** -3.530*** -20.920*** -20.507*** 0.004 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.761) (0.713) 
auditor_change 0.763* 0.756* 0.824 0.855 0.001 0.000 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.553) (0.523) (0.920) (0.988) 
size 0.097 0.098 -0.581 -0.507 -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.141) (0.136) (0.140) (0.199) (0.000) (0.000) 
loss 0.099 0.103 1.600** 1.622** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.549) (0.538) (0.025) (0.023) (0.591) (0.600) 
growth -0.941*** -0.935*** 0.652 0.740 0.074*** 0.073*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.621) (0.571) (0.000) (0.000) 
lev -0.509 -0.520 0.578 0.088 0.005 0.005 
 (0.196) (0.188) (0.775) (0.964) (0.511) (0.467) 
sales_volatility -0.649 -0.643 3.255** 3.307** 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (0.101) (0.104) (0.022) (0.019) (0.001) (0.002) 
age 0.433*** 0.433*** 0.122 0.040 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.824) (0.941) (0.674) (0.665) 
boardmeeting 0.023 0.022 0.138** 0.123* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.200) (0.206) (0.050) (0.085) (0.825) (0.848) 
GDP -12.146*** -12.127*** -3.507 -3.918 0.001 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.490) (0.437) (0.940) (0.904) 
lag_DACC     0.056** 0.055** 
     (0.027) (0.031) 
Constant 156.242*** 155.995*** 53.036 57.867 0.080 0.067 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.428) (0.384) (0.751) (0.789) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1812 1812 513 513 1358 1358 
Adjusted (Pseudo) 
R2 0.183 0.183 0.409 0.410 0.048 0.048 
*, **, *** Denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively.
59	
	
Table 8 
Sensitivity Test on the Association between Client Importance and Audit 
Quality in Three Jurisdictions Excluding Financial Institutions 
 
Panel A: Hong Kong 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE positive_DACC positive_DACC 
CI_FEE 0.555  1.056  0.007  
 (0.251)  (0.223)  (0.378)  
CI_ASSETS  1.102**  1.782**  0.016* 
  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.098) 
neweffort -0.001 -0.001 -0.019 -0.019 0.000 0.000 
 (0.779) (0.798) (0.123) (0.118) (0.302) (0.274) 
Big4 -0.947** -0.940** 0.677 0.687 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.302) (0.286) (0.768) (0.813) 
MKTCON -2.199 -1.952 -5.352** -4.897* -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.277) (0.327) (0.047) (0.064) (0.883) (0.945) 
auditor_change 0.561** 0.568** -0.839 -0.828 0.002 0.002 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.283) (0.290) (0.614) (0.597) 
size 0.048 0.027 0.076 0.058 -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.603) (0.773) (0.658) (0.734) (0.077) (0.064) 
loss 1.054*** 1.051*** 0.738* 0.758* -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.094) (0.085) (0.263) (0.275) 
growth -0.008 -0.017 0.114 0.108 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.914) (0.818) (0.405) (0.429) (0.000) (0.000) 
lev 2.228*** 2.231*** 1.415** 1.458*** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.468) (0.464) 
sales_volatility 0.219 0.225 0.049 0.044 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.124) (0.111) (0.883) (0.894) (0.000) (0.000) 
age 0.036 0.036 -0.578** -0.618*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.820) (0.818) (0.012) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
boardmeeting 0.429*** 0.435*** -1.064** -1.091*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.694) (0.705) 
GDP 1.029 1.054 6.355 6.304 0.000 0.000 
 (0.559) (0.550) (0.322) (0.325) (0.999) (0.999) 
lag_DACC     0.047*** 0.047*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -19.816 -19.745 -82.441 -81.377 0.078*** 0.080*** 
 (0.365) (0.367) (0.300) (0.306) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3563 3563 1829 1829 3564 3564 
Adjusted (Pseudo) R2 0.317 0.320 0.113 0.122 0.095 0.096 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Panel B: Mainland 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE positive_DACC positive_DACC 
CI_FEE 0.153  0.977  0.002  
 (0.813)  (0.117)  (0.799)  
CI_ASSETS  -0.044  1.065**  0.007 
  (0.944)  (0.033)  (0.417) 
neweffort 0.050*** 0.051*** -0.018 -0.019 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.343) (0.321) (0.035) (0.038) 
Big4 0.724** 0.726** -0.483 -0.428 -0.008* -0.008* 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.364) (0.421) (0.050) (0.055) 
LLP 0.257 0.252 0.746** 0.753** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.311) (0.321) (0.012) (0.011) (0.841) (0.843) 
MKTCON -1.110 -1.298 -8.743*** -8.595*** -0.035 -0.029 
 (0.606) (0.536) (0.006) (0.005) (0.337) (0.410) 
auditor_change 0.487*** 0.488*** 0.148 0.148 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.448) (0.449) (0.677) (0.676) 
size -
0.728*** 
-
0.725*** 
-0.172* -0.196** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.034) (0.721) (0.860) 
loss 1.330*** 1.331*** 0.894*** 0.899*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
growth -
0.733*** 
-
0.736*** 
-0.117 -0.118 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.561) (0.557) (0.000) (0.000) 
lev 3.572*** 3.571*** 0.674** 0.672** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
sales_volatility -0.154 -0.154 -0.123 -0.117 0.003 0.003 
 (0.393) (0.392) (0.492) (0.512) (0.171) (0.167) 
age 0.672*** 0.672*** 0.286* 0.290* -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.081) (0.077) (0.291) (0.296) 
boardmeeting 0.338* 0.341* 0.476** 0.478** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.081) (0.077) (0.035) (0.034) (0.040) (0.040) 
GDP 0.229 0.237 -2.265*** -2.259*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.641) (0.630) (0.000) (0.000) (0.999) (0.999) 
SOE -0.037 -0.037 -0.066 -0.064 -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.780) (0.779) (0.672) (0.681) (0.049) (0.049) 
lag_DACC     0.022*** 0.022*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.652 2.473 34.368*** 34.770*** 0.065** 0.069** 
 (0.736) (0.753) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.022) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8918 8918 8832 8832 6815 6815 
Adjusted(Pseudo) 
R2 
0.414 0.414 0.087 0.087 0.123 0.123 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Taiwan 
 
 MAO MAO RESTATE RESTATE positive_DACC positive_DACC 
CI_FEE -0.209  0.534  -0.006  
 (0.728)  (0.692)  (0.515)  
CI_ASSETS  -0.312  -1.068  0.005 
  (0.587)  (0.583)  (0.645) 
neweffort -0.028** -0.028** -0.028 -0.028 -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.676) (0.678) (0.035) (0.034) 
Big4 0.388 0.372 2.456 1.958 0.003 0.005 
 (0.191) (0.192) (0.111) (0.195) (0.630) (0.318) 
LLP -0.274 -0.296 1.559 1.410 0.006 0.005 
 (0.662) (0.636) (0.526) (0.519) (0.627) (0.653) 
MKTCON -3.532*** -3.530*** -20.920*** -20.507*** 0.004 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.765) (0.718) 
auditor_change 0.763* 0.756* 0.824 0.855 0.001 0.000 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.553) (0.523) (0.921) (0.988) 
size 0.097 0.098 -0.581 -0.507 -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.141) (0.136) (0.140) (0.199) (0.000) (0.000) 
loss 0.099 0.103 1.600** 1.622** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.549) (0.538) (0.025) (0.023) (0.597) (0.606) 
growth -0.941*** -0.935*** 0.652 0.740 0.074*** 0.073*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.621) (0.571) (0.000) (0.000) 
lev -0.509 -0.520 0.578 0.088 0.005 0.005 
 (0.196) (0.188) (0.775) (0.964) (0.518) (0.474) 
sales_volatility -0.649 -0.643 3.255** 3.307** 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (0.101) (0.104) (0.022) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) 
age 0.433*** 0.433*** 0.122 0.040 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.824) (0.941) (0.679) (0.670) 
boardmeeting 0.023 0.022 0.138** 0.123* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.200) (0.206) (0.050) (0.085) (0.828) (0.850) 
GDP -12.146*** -12.127*** -3.507 -3.918 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.490) (0.437) (0.999) (0.999) 
lag_DACC     0.056** 0.055** 
     (0.030) (0.034) 
Constant 156.242*** 155.995*** 53.036 57.867 0.099*** 0.097*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.428) (0.384) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1812 1812 513 513 1358 1358 
Adjusted(Pseudo) R2 0.183 0.183 0.409 0.410 0.127 0.127 
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